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STATE REVENUE DEDICATED FOR
SPECIAL PURPOSES: A PROPOSED
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
MARK ANDREWS*
ABSTRACT
The Alaska State budget has decreased in recent years, and because of the lower
price of oil, it is not expected to recover in the near term. This smaller budgetary
pie may intensify the impulse to protect the funding of individual projects.
However, the Alaska Constitution forbids the dedication of taxes for specific
purposes. This Essay proposes a state constitutional amendment that would
allow such dedications, subject to limits designed to avoid potential problems.
The Essay describes the effect the proposal would have had on past decisions of
the Alaska Supreme Court and compares the dedication of tax revenue to the
“New Property” identified by Charles Reich.

I. INTRODUCTION
“The economic outlook Alaska faces today is dire.”1 This difficult
situation may persist for some years. In 2014, the price of oil declined from
$110 per barrel to $30.2 It has not since recovered and is not expected to
do so in the near term.3 Since statehood, on average, about two-thirds of
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1. OFF. OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL J. DUNLEAVY, AN HONEST BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR
2020, at 3 (2020), https://gov.alaska.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/02132019-FY20BudgetSummary.pdf.
2. OFF. OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL DUNLEAVY, FY2021 BUDGET OVERVIEW AND 10YEAR PLAN, at 2 (2019),
https://omb.alaska.gov/ombfiles/21_budget/PDFs/FY2021_10_Year_Plan_1211-19.pdf.
3. See id. (stating that although the Alaskan economy had seen earlier cycles
of fluctuating oil prices, “[t]he oil price decline in FY 2014. . . was different. Many
Alaskans and even industry experts were predicting a one to two-year price
downturn followed by another rapid recovery. In the six years since the price of
Alaska North Slope (ANS) crude oil dropped from $110 per barrel, to an average
of $30 per barrel, the price of ANS has struggled to surpass $60-$65 per barrel for
any meaningful period of time.”); ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, SPRING 2021 REVENUE
FORECAST (2021),
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the State’s unrestricted general fund revenue has been supplied by taxes
on petroleum.4
Many worthwhile projects are currently at risk of defunding. This
Essay proposes a partial solution: the authorization to dedicate tax
revenue for special purposes, albeit with limits that avoid the serious
problems with revenue dedication that were identified at the Alaska
Constitutional Convention.
By law, each year the Governor submits “a fiscal plan with estimates
of significant sources and uses of funds for the succeeding 10 fiscal
years.”5 The plan balances “sources and uses of funds held while
providing for essential state services and protecting the economic stability
of the state.”6 The 2020 plan estimated no increase in unrestricted state
revenues above 2022 levels until 2027.7 “The pandemic and resulting
economic fallout significantly worsened Alaska’s fiscal position.”8 The
plan offered policy choices to improve this position,9 but noted “a
continued period of uncertainty” as a result of the pandemic.10
Given this uncertainty, many stakeholders often want to define a
slice of the budgetary pie, protect the necessary funds, and preserve any
potentially endangered projects. The first such use of a dedicated tax was
a gasoline tax, adopted in Oregon in 1919.11 By the time of the Alaska
Constitutional Convention, the dedication of tax revenue was the practice
in thirty-seven states.12
Today, however, this tool is unavailable for Alaska. The
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/documentviewer/viewer.aspx?1652r
(forecasting the price at $71 by 2030); ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PRELIMINARY FALL
2021 FORECAST (2021),
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/documentviewer/viewer.aspx?1692r
(“The long-run ANS price is assumed to remain flat beyond FY 2023, with nominal
prices increasing with inflation to $90.00 per barrel by FY 2031.”).
4. MOUHCINE GUETTABI, BUDGET BASICS 1975-2021, at 10 (2019),
https://pubs.iseralaska.org/media/e4a6ab15-5a0c-4695-af5a3d5c800fd70f/2019_12_16-BudgetBasics.pdf.
5. ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.020(b) (2021).
6. Id. § 37.07.020(b)(2). Alaska law requires a balanced budget. Id. §
37.07.020(c) (“Proposed expenditures may not exceed estimated revenue for the
succeeding fiscal year.”).
7. OFF. OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL J. DUNLEAVY, FY2022 BUDGET OVERVIEW AND
10-YEAR PLAN, at 7 (2020),
https://omb.alaska.gov/ombfiles/22_budget/PDFs/FY2022_10_Year_Plan_12.
11.20.pdf. In millions, the plan estimated the state’s unrestricted revenue for 2022
as $4,271.9; for 2027 as $4,329.5; and for 2031 as $4565.2. Id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 2–6.
10. Id. at 4.
11. PUB. ADMIN. SERV., CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES VOL. IX, at 27 (1955)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES].
12. Id. at 28.
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Constitutional Convention prohibited dedicated taxes.13 The convention
delegates concluded that, once created, dedicated taxes are too difficult to
repeal.14 “[T]he good that might come from the dedication of funds for a
particular purpose was outweighed by the long-term harm to state
finances that would result from a broad application of the practice.”15
Accordingly, the convention identified dedicated taxation as a “fiscal
evil.”16
Still, the political impulse to protect funding remains strong and the
idea of dedicating revenue has remained popular.17 While avoiding the
ban on dedication, Alaska has continued to create specified accounts
within the State’s general fund.18 The dedication temptation and its
danger to state finances remain.
This Essay proposes an amendment to the Alaska Constitution to
permit dedicated taxes, but within defined limits. The measure would
secure the funds for popular programs but circumscribe the length, terms,
and conditions of the dedication, in order to avoid both the creation of a
permanent class of stakeholders and a burden on future legislatures.

II. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The non-dedication clause is brief but powerful: “The proceeds of
any state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose . . .
.”19 There are no exceptions, except for mineral revenue dedicated to the
Alaska Permanent Fund.20
The proposed amendment would permit dedication of revenue for
up to ten years by popular vote and one renewal for an identical term by
a vote of the legislature. In detail, the amendment would provide:
1. Revenue may be dedicated for a special purpose within the
terms of this section.
2. By a three-fifths majority vote, the legislature may send to the
people a proposition to dedicate revenue to a special purpose for

13. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7.
14. See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162, 1168 (Alaska
2009) (citations omitted) (finding that convention delegates were concerned that
dedicated taxes would reduce legislative and executive control of taxes and
budgets).
15. Id. at 1176–77.
16. 6 MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS: ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 111 (Alaska Legis. Council 1965) (Committee on Finance and
Taxation Dec. 16, 1955) [hereinafter 6 PACC].
17. See discussion infra Section III.A–B.
18. Id.
19. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7.
20. Id. §§ 7, 15.
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a period not to exceed ten years. The proposition shall pass upon
a simple majority popular vote. The proposition shall identify
the dedicated revenue source, its purpose, and its duration. The
proposition shall pertain to a single subject.
3. By a simple majority vote, and before expiration of the
dedication period, the legislature may renew the original
proposition for one period, not to exceed the original term.
4. The dedicated revenue creates a fund. Upon expiration of the
dedication period, the unexpended and unobligated balance
shall lapse into the general fund.
The content of this proposal reflects a balance of public interests. The
ultimate goal of the amendment is to preserve legislative discretion while
assuring stable funding for specific projects.

III. HISTORIC BACKDROP AND THE POLITICAL ISSUES OF
DEDICATED FUNDS
A. Preserving Legislative Discretion
The primary challenge with allowing for dedicated funds is
preventing good intentions from engulfing the state budget. In 1955,
twenty-seven percent of the Alaska territorial budget was earmarked for
specified purposes, “primarily for schools and roads.”21 Although this
percentage was among the lowest in the nation,22 convention delegates
saw this as the beginning of a problem.23 The delegates looked to the
examples of other western states to analyze how earmarking affected
their respective budgets.24 In Colorado about “ninety per cent of tax
collections [were] earmarked.”25 In Texas the figure was eighty-five26 or
ninety27 percent, and in Kansas eighty.28
Two states, Georgia and New Jersey, had made progress toward
abolishing earmarks.29 However, “[a]ttempts to reverse the trend toward
dedication ha[d] encountered considerable resistance from the benefitting

21. 6 PACC, supra note 16, at 111; 4 MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS:
ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2368 (Alaska Legis. Council 1965)
(statement of Del. Dorothy Awes on Jan. 17, 1956) [hereinafter 4 PACC].
22. Id.
23. CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, supra note 11, at 28.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 4 PACC, supra note 21, at 2368.
28. CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, supra note 11, at 28.
29. Id. at 29.
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interests.”30 This resistance touched the fundamentals of what a
government is. One staff paper for the constitutional convention quoted
the Governor of New Jersey as stating that New Jersey’s Highway
Department, supported by a dedicated fund, was, “in effect, a
government unto itself, instead of being part of an integrated state
administrative system.”31
Basic considerations of fairness and equity favor proliferation of
accounts dedicated to specific purposes. The convention delegates
recognized the political momentum that such accounts create:
If allocation is permitted for one interest the denial of it to
another is difficult, and the more special funds are set up the
more difficult it becomes to deny other requests until the point
is reached where neither the governor nor the legislature has any
real control over the finances of the state.32
Considerations of equitable treatment are legitimate. Why should
the state favor one group with a steady stream of revenue, but exclude all
others? This kind of dedication could thus quickly remove all practical
legislative discretion over funds.
During deliberations, convention delegates nevertheless recognized
the benefits of earmarking. For one, “certain [projects] like capital
improvements are more apt to be taken care of if you allow earmarking.”33
There is also the political benefit of raising funds for a specific, popular
goal, rather than a general tax hike.34 Such taxes reduce taxpayer
resistance by guaranteeing that the funds generated would be used to
benefit those who paid it.35 But the loss of legislative discretion ultimately
bore too many risks for the delegates, and the constitutional prohibition
was adopted.
B. The Dedication Temptation
Although the prohibition is the law in name, in practice Alaska
already allows for some fund dedications within specified accounts.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 6 PACC, supra note 16, at 111.
33. 4 PACC, supra note 21, at 2368 (statement of Del. Dorothy Awes on Jan.
17, 1956).
34. Delegates Frank Peratrovich and Marvin Marston pointed to the
popularity of such projects. Id. at 2369–70. Delegate Marston was particularly
effusive: “We [in Spenard] have happy dollars going in that treasury because it is
earmarked for roads and happy dollars are the best kind of dollars . . . .” Id. at
2370.
35. CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, supra note 11, at 27.
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Because good and worthy causes are perennial and universal, there is a
consistent and pervasive incentive to dedicate funds. Such accounts have
been used in the state for decades; in 1975 the Attorney General,
discussing the dedication of state revenue from the sale or lease of natural
resources, observed that “[t]he situation the Convention expressly sought
to avoid [the dedication of revenue] is precisely the situation that is
developing.”36 In a 2003 report, the Institute for Social and Economic
Research listed almost forty accounts within the state general fund that
were nominally assigned to particular programs.37
The creation of such accounts continues today. Examples include the
Arctic Winter Games Team Alaska trust (2001),38 the alcohol and other
drug abuse treatment and prevention fund (2002),39 youth courts (2010),40
revenue derived from the refined fuel surcharge (2015),41 and the peace
officer and firefighters survivors’ fund (2017).42 The special accounts
avoid the non-dedication clause by providing that nothing in the creation
of the fund dedicates money for a specific purpose.43
Together, the legislative creation of special accounts and court
decisions that apply the non-dedication clause44 suggest that the
inclination to dedicate taxes appears in budgets both fat and lean. The
difference in the state budget today is the unanticipated duration of the
lean period.45

36. Dedication of Revenues Derived from the Lease or Sale of Natural
Resources, 9 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 22 (1975).
37. Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Rsch., General Funds, Index to Funds, THE ALASKA
CITIZEN’S
GUIDE
TO
THE
BUDGET,
§§
6.3,
6.8
(2003),
https://iseralaska.org/projects/citizens-guide-to-the-budget/ (web material
was archived in 2019, but may be downloaded at the link).
38. Finance Trust Funds, 2001 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 21 § 1 (codified as
amended at ALASKA STAT. § 37.14.600 (2021)).
39. Revenue and Taxation Alcoholic Beverages, 2002 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
116 § 4, (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.60.050 (2021)). The tax on
alcoholic beverages, section 43.60, was first enacted in 1933. 2020 ALASKA DEP’T OF
REVENUE, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE TAX ANN. REP. However, the fund itself dates from
2002. Id.
40. Delinquent Children Fines and Penalties, 2010 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 110
§ 3 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.410 (2021)).
41. Fuel—Motor Fuel Taxes—Surcharges, 2015 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 37 § 2
(codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.40.007 (2021)).
42. Peace Officer and Firefighters Survivors’ Fund, 2017 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 14 § 1 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 39.60.010 (2021)).
43. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.14.600(c) (2021) (winter games); id. § 37.05.580(c)
(tobacco use); id. § 47.12.410 (youth courts); id. § 43.40.007 (fuel surcharge); id. §
39.60.010(e) (peace officer survivors’).
44. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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C. The Property Right in a Dedicated Tax
Though these kinds of accounts act as a workaround for the
dedicated funds prohibition, they cannot eliminate the issues associated
with dedicated funds. The problem originates in the property-like quality
of a dedicated tax. With considerable insight, the Alaska Public
Administration Service observed in its “Constitutional Studies” for the
Alaska Statehood Committee:
The dedication of revenue leads a particular group of taxpayers
to feel that revenues derived from certain licenses or fees belong
to them as a group, hence they tend to consent more readily to
the imposition of such taxes but will resist en masse any attempt
at diversion, regardless of the worthiness of the purpose.46
The Public Administration Service anticipated the development,
benefits, and risks of government-created entitlements. In 1964, Charles
Reich termed such wealth “The New Property.”47 “New Property” is most
closely associated with public welfare benefits, licenses, and permits,48
but Reich identified a variety of government-created assets, including the
use of public resources.49
Entitlements create valuable property for individuals.50 In such
property, Reich saw the same impetus for political support as the
statehood committee had seen a decade earlier. “As government largess
has grown in importance, quite naturally there has been pressure for the
protection of individual interests in it.”51 Similarly, dedicated tax revenue
creates a group of stakeholders who share a common interest; the effect is
the same. The challenge here is to find a balance: to create a property
interest and its opportunities, while minimizing the potential risks to the
public. The best answer will adjust the nature of the dedication itself until
the chances of fulfilling the intended public interest are maximized.

IV. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT ON CURRENT LAW
A. The Effect of the New Provision on Past Court Decisions
The non-dedication clause has been the subject of four opinions of
the Alaska Supreme Court. In each case, the court either held the subject

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, supra note 11, at 30.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 739.
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statute unconstitutional or upheld the statute after finding the clause
inapplicable.52 The amendment proposed in this Essay would enable
lawmakers to successfully recraft each of the statutes challenged in these
cases.
1. State v. Alex53
In Alex, the court held the challenged statute to be an
unconstitutional dedication.54 The law created “an assessment on the sale
of salmon by commercial fishermen to processors.”55 A local “qualified
regional association” administered the assessment, whose purpose was
to provide revenue for the association’s financing the development of
fisheries.56 Assessments on salmon sales were approved by a vote of the
association members and then reviewed for reasonableness by the
Commissioner of Commerce and Economic Development.57 The court
held that the assessment was a “tax” for purposes of article IX, section 7,
and thus an unlawful dedication.58
The delegation of legislative power to the regional associations was
further held unconstitutional as an improper delegation of the
legislature’s taxing power, prohibited under the Alaska Constitution,
article X, section 2.59 “The legislature . . . may not create an independent
entity with authority to decide whether to impose the tax.”60
Under the proposed amendment, the same assessment would
survive as a lawful dedication for a special purpose, but would still
require redrafting to avoid the delegation of the taxing power to an entity
besides a city or borough.
52. However, the court has twice upheld statutes despite challenges based on
the non-dedication clause. See State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86,
98–101 (Alaska 2016) (upholding a school funding formula that required local
government contribution); Myers v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 68 P.3d 386, 387–88
(Alaska 2003) (finding the state legislature earmarking funds from an anticipated
settlement to be used for education did not violate the non-dedication clause).
53. 646 P.2d 203 (Alaska 1982).
54. Id. at 207–11.
55. Id. at 205.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 210. State attempts to protect the assessment as a valid exercise of
enumerated powers, in this case state control of its natural resources, were held
to be without merit. Id. at 210–11. The proposed amendment would have two
effects: first, it would moot this issue because a mechanism would be available to
dedicate revenue; second, it would not alter the ruling that the enumerated
powers do not themselves authorize dedication.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id. at 211. The delegation to the Commissioner of Commerce and
Economic Development was also challenged. Id. In light of its ruling that
invalidated the delegation to the associations, the court did not reach the question
of the delegation to the commissioner. Id.
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2. Sonneman v. Hickel61
Sonneman involved a challenge to the Alaska Marine Highway
System Fund.62 The court upheld most of the act.63 However, one section
limited state departmental power to request that the fund be appropriated
for capital improvements; the court held that this section was a violation
of the non-dedication clause.64
The statute created “the Alaska Marine Highway System Fund as a
special account in the general fund.”65 The marine highway system
deposited the gross revenue earned from operating the ferry system into
this account.66 The legislature could appropriate amounts from the
account back to the marine highway system,67 which was within the
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities.68
Problems arose in the constraints on departmental discretion. There
were accounting restrictions on the financial condition of the fund and the
size of the capital funds request.69 The Department could request that the
legislature appropriate money from the fund for capital improvements to
the marine highway system, but only under certain conditions.70
The court cited the purposes set by the constitutional convention:
“As the [convention] debates make clear, all departments were to be ‘in
the same position’ as competitors for funds with the need to ‘sell their
viewpoint along with everyone else.’”71 The proposed amendment would
permit such restrictions on departmental requests. With the change put
forth here, the dedication process would avoid the prohibition and the
same provision would be lawful.
3. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State72
In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (SEACC), the challenged
provision granted the University of Alaska title to certain land and

61. 836 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1992).
62. Id. at 937.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 937–38.
66. Id. at 938.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. To request money, “the legislature must have made an annual
appropriation from the fund,” the fund must be ten percent larger than the sum
of gross revenues and non-lapsable general fund appropriations, and the
requested capital appropriations cannot be more than fifty percent of the
remaining balance after the annual appropriation. Id.
71. Id. at 940 (quoting 4 PACC, supra note 21, at 2364–67 (statements of Del.
Barrie White)).
72. 202 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2009).
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dedicated the funds generated to a university endowment fund.73 Once
again, the court struck down the provision as an unconstitutional
dedication.74
The endowment became the subject of much legislative controversy
and litigation over several years.75 When the dust settled, the act
conveyed to the university ownership of the land identified by the
“University of Alaska Land Grant List 2005.”76 All “net income derived
from the . . . land selected by and conveyed to the University . . . was to
be . . . held in the University’s endowment trust fund (ETF).”77 The law
mandated that the principal of the endowment be held in perpetuity, and
that “[t]he total return from the [ETF would] be used exclusively for the
University of Alaska.”78 The court held that this endowment violated the
non-dedication clause.79
Within some practical limits, an endowment fund similar to that in
SEACC could be created under the proposed amendment. The proposed
amendment has firm time limits. A land sale as in SEACC might
effectively limit title transfers to a term of years, and leases to relatively
brief periods. Probably the smoothest way to create an endowment fund
would be to designate the state lands whose income would pour into the
dedicated fund, without attempting a title transfer to the university.
4. Wielechowski v. Alaska80
The court in Wielechowski held that the non-dedication clause did not
apply to the revenue raised from an established, permanent fund.81
In 1976, the voters approved the creation of the Alaska Permanent
Fund by amendment to the state constitution.82 The same amendment
changed the non-dedication clause; unlike other funds in the state
treasury, the legislature could lawfully direct revenue streams from
mineral resources to the new permanent fund.83
Wielechowski presented the dedication question from the other
direction: given that revenue can be dedicated for deposit into the
permanent fund, may the revenue produced by the fund be similarly

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1165–66.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1165–66.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1164.
403 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2017).
Id. at 1143.
ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15.
Wielechowski, 403 P.3d at 1143.
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dedicated?84 If the court had answered yes, the effect would have been to
sidestep a governor’s veto. The subject funds would have been dedicated
and so outside the definition of annual appropriations, and thus free from
the governor’s veto.85
The court’s detailed analysis examined the framers’ intent at the
constitutional convention, the intent of the voters in 1976, and the plain
meaning of the permanent fund exception added to the non-dedication
clause.86 The opinion twice calls upon the phrase “fiscal evil,” first used
at the constitutional convention to describe dedicated funds.87 The court
found that revenue produced by the permanent fund was subject to the
non-dedication clause, and unprotected from a gubernatorial veto.88
Dedicating revenue from the Alaska Permanent Fund could indeed
be accomplished by a constitutional amendment as proposed here.
However, the body of law creating and surrounding the fund is so
complex that a new amendment should avoid any further complexity; it
should not permit dedication of appropriations from the fund.
B. Circumscribing the Dedication and Preserving the Public Interest
The restrictions on dedication are sufficient to mitigate the propertylike characteristics of dedicated revenue. There would be no such thing as
a permanent dedication, and the dual votes of the legislature and the
people reduce the risk of dedications for narrow purposes.
The requirement of a three-fifths vote in the legislature is more likely
to assure a strong, statewide interest in the specific dedication.89 Given
the disapproval of the constitutional convention to dedicated funds, the
consensus to overturn that decision, even on a limited basis, should be
firm and clear. The requirement of a popular vote both shows such a
consensus and assures that the dedication represents more than simple
horse-trading among members of the legislature.
The ten-year time limit circumscribes the ownership quality of the
dedicated fund, while preserving the opportunity to fulfill a variety of
public interests. Larger systemic and cultural issues are less likely to be
84. Id. at 1146.
85. See id. at 1143 (stating the permanent fund “is subject to normal
appropriation and veto budgetary processes”).
86. Id. at 1148–52.
87. Id. at 1144, 1147.
88. Id. at 1143.
89. “Supermajorities are intended to prevent a ‘tyranny of the majority,’ and
also encourage deliberation and compromise as proponents attempt to gather
enough votes to reach a supermajority.” Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures,
Supermajority Vote Requirements, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/supermajority-vote-requirements.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
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resolved within such time limits, and thus would remain within the
power of the legislature to address. The legislature could deny such larger
issues as access to the ballot. The dedicated fund could exist for ten years
on first enactment, and potentially for twenty years if renewed. This time
frame would allow the legislature to evaluate the efficacy of the fund over
the long-term, while also providing stable support for the specific cause.
A time limit also requires that proponents consider whether a
dedication of revenue is worthwhile in light of its intended purpose.90 The
proponent would have to select only those projects that qualified. A
revenue stream is assured for no more than ten years, with renewal only
a possibility, and then for no more than another ten years. Given these
time limits, proponents must ask themselves: is the game worth the
candle?
Perhaps the most important function of the ten-year limit is to
dissolve the permanence of the new arrangement. If the project and its tax
will exist in perpetuity, then it becomes a property interest of the class of
stakeholders. The forms of government largess surveyed by Charles
Reich generally assume some degree of permanence, forfeited only upon
some type of misconduct.91 The ten-year limit prevents the stakeholder
class from concluding that there exists a part of the state budget that is
forever their own.
To avoid excessive dedications, the purpose of each ballot
proposition is limited to a single subject. The constitution limits legislative
bills to a single subject;92 a proposed dedication is simply another bill, just
scheduled for a popular vote. Proposals sent to the people should not
become a method of sidestepping this constitutional restriction.
The single-subject limit will help assure that proposals focus on
issues of statewide interest. Otherwise, the political temptation may be to
assemble propositions until a statewide majority is manufactured out of
a combination of local and regional issues.93 Such an assemblage of many
dedicated funds would threaten the legislative discretion that the
Constitutional Convention sought to protect.
90. There is no overriding consideration which dictates a period of ten years.
Ten seems to be the fulcrum where two factors balance. As the time period rises
above ten years, the dedication begins to take on the characteristics of a permanent
government program; as the time period shortens below ten years, it becomes less
likely that a worthwhile program could be set up and operated within the more
limited time frame.
91. Reich, supra note 47, at 734–46.
92. See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13 (restricting each bill in the legislature to a
single subject).
93. See Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (“It is generally
agreed that the primary aim of ‘one subject’ provisions in state constitutions is the
restraint of log-rolling in the legislative process.”).
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The risk of the single-subject rule is that it might result in ballot
propositions that are too narrow. The dedication might be too narrow to
ever garner a majority vote, or, if passed, too narrow to accomplish a
worthwhile purpose. This risk is best covered by the requirement of a
three-fifths majority vote in the legislature; an excessively narrow
proposition is unlikely to pass.
The flexibility of the proposed amendment permits focus on the
problem and allows the design of an appropriate solution. The dedication
might be set to expire after a period shorter than ten years. The taxes
might be set to expire when a stated dollar amount has been deposited to
the fund. A new fund might dedicate half of an already-existing revenue
stream and leave the remainder to the ordinary appropriations process.
Finally, state revenue not dedicated pursuant to the terms of the
amendment would remain subject to the non-dedication prohibition of
article IX, section 7.

V. CONCLUSION
Alaska’s budgetary challenge is likely to continue for the foreseeable
future. Many worthwhile programs will see reductions or elimination,
despite their popularity or their importance to a group of stakeholders.
This proposal is intended to open a discussion to meet this challenge. The
dedication of revenue can be permitted and limited to preserve the
intentions of the founders while raising predictable and stable revenue
for special purposes.

